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Thisstudy uses a Cox proportional hazards model toestimate the
relationship between state-level collectivebargaining policies and
union growth in the public sector. Theproportional hazards analysis
is performed with data onapproximately eight hundred municipal police
departments. The timing of unionization in thesedepartments clearly
indicates that unionization rarelyprecedes the enactment of a statute.
Where bargaining laws have not beenenacted, formal collective bargaining
between municipalities and their police isvirtually nonexistant. More-
over, the proportional hazards analysis that controls for theeffects of
other state-level and municipal-levelcovariates indicates that the bar-
gaining laws and policies are the most important determinantof unioniza-
tion among police. Among differenttypes of bargaining policies, "duty-
to-bargain" provisions lead to higher unionizationrates than do statutes
that permit, but do not require, employersto bargain with police. How-
ever, after controlling for for the effects of othercovariates, there
appears to be no difference in the unionization rates between thestates
that have duty-to-bargain provisionsalong with an interest arbitration
mechanism and those states that have duty-to-bargainprovisions without
such a dispute resolution mechanism.
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I. Introduction
Entering the 1960s, few public
sector employees were organized.By
1980, approximately 43% of allgovermflent employees in the UnitedStates
were members of Unions.1 Forcertain occupationalgroups, Particularly
the protectiveservices, collective bargainingestablishes salaries and
working Conditions for the vast
majority of departments in the United
States.2 Thisexplosion in public sector unionismhas occurred while
private sector unionization has
declined dramatically. It alsocoincides
with the passage of state lawsthat provide variousdegrees of protection
of public employees'rights to organize and to bargaincollectively. The
role that these laws play inthe growth of publicsector unionism is the
central focus of this study.
II. Previous Research andCurrent Methodology
Largely because the coverage of theNational Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) extends across mostareas of private sectoremployment, econo-
metric investigations of the
relationshIp between policy variables and
union growth using privatesector data are necessarilyvery limited.
The most convincing studiesare perhaps case studies ofgroups that were
at times covered by the NIRA andat other times notcovered; for example,
supervisors in the Foremen's Association
of America3 in the late 1930s
and early l940s, or agriculturalworkers in the United Farm Workersin
California in the late 1960s.4 In
contrast, the public sector providesa
better laboratory forexamining the linkages between puLicpolicies and
Union growth given the extreme
variation in public sectcr collective2
bargaining laws across states and across differentoccuptional groups.
Despite this fact, there have been very few investigationsof the rela-
tionship between bargaining laws and union growthin the public sector.5
The data and methodologies used in previous studies are quitelimited and
not entirely appropriate for uncovering the relationshipsof interest.
By employing municipal-level data with datesof unionization among United
States police departments, this study employs a proportionalhazards
technique to uncover the impact of different bargaininglaws and other
state and municipal characteristics on police unionization.
Level of Analysis
Previous studies of the relationship between bargaining lawsand
public employee unionism focus exclusively onunionization among teach-
ers. They rely on aggregate state-level dataand therefore suffer from
several inherent limitations. First, it is generally arguedin these
studies that it is easier to form new bargaining unitswhere legislation
is more favorable to public employee bargaining.The state-level percent
organized or percent covered measures used as dependentvariables,
however, are affected not only by the formationof new units, but also by
subsequent emploent effects of collectivebargaining.6 Second,
state-level percent organized variables give equal weight to a given
percentage increase in unionization indifferent states, even though the
same percent increase represents very differentnumbers of bargaining
units and covered employees from state to state. For example, a gin
percentage increase in New Hampshire's percentorganized may corresi rid
to the formation of only a very small number of bargainingunits covering3
relatively few employees, while inCalifornia the samepercentage in-
crease may mean a very large numberof new units were formed.
Finally,
state-level analyses cannotprovide any information on the kindsof
municipalities that are more or lesslikely to enter bargaining relation-
ships with their departments.
This study focuses on themunicipal_level, which is normally the
level at which bargainingunits are formed for mostpublic sector Occupa-
tions. The data for thisstudy pertain to approximatelyi,ooo municipal
police departments and describe the
history of Unionization, as wellas
characteristics of the
department, the municipality and thestate.
Model Specification:Proportional Hazards Framework
With municipal-leveldata, more appropriate specificationsthan
those used previously can beemployed. The existing state-levelstudies
are generally cross-sectional andcan only document whether unionization
tends to be higher in states that
have laws; they revealnothing about
the more interestingquestion of whether or not thelegislation is
necessary to permit the growth. Even where the
longitudinal information
has been brought to bearon the question, several problemsremain.
Institutionally, the decision to forma bargaining unit carries with ita
great deal of inertia. There is little
evidence of decertifjcation in
the public sector or of Unionized
municipal departments going out of
business.7However, models that expresspercent organized (as a level)
as a function of bargaining laws
implicitly assume that municipal de-
partments choose whether or not toorganize in each period. Forexample,
adepartment that unionizes in thefirst period after theenactment of a4
law adds to the level of unionization in each subsequentperiod analyzed.
The inaccurate assumption about the underlying processof forming muni-
cipal bargaining units will greatly overstatethe precision of the
estimated parameters. This particular problem is overcometo some extent
by analyzing changes in the percentunionized variable.8 Still, even
this specification suffers from all of the inherentlimitations asso-
ciated with state-level data described above.
With more detailed municipal-level data, the processof bargaining
unit formation can be modelled as a duration study:what determines the
length of time that will pass before a departmentunionizes? By posing
the problem this way, each municipal police departmentis treated as
providing information on one possibletransition into unionization.
Several alternative dependent duration variables are developedin the
next section. Whatever assumptions are used todefine different duration
variables, exact values of any dependent durationvariable can be calcu-
lated only for unionized departments. Durationvariables for nonunion
departments must be treated as "right-censored";that is, it is not known
how much longer than the current period the municipality'snonunion
status will last.
Let the dependent duration variable to bedefined in the next -
sectionbe represented by Toanalyze the multivariate determinants
of Y., a Cox proportional-hazards (PH) model is employed.Let: f(Y)
represent the probability density functionof the duration variable; F(Y)
the cumulative probability function; and H(Y)f(Y)/(1-F(Y)) the hazard
function describing transitions into unionization.The basic approach of
the PH model is to assume multiplicative effectsof the independent
variables according to theform:95
H(Y)H(Y)exp(X)
where X is a vector of
municipal- and state-level variablesthat influ-
ence the decision to form abargaining unit. No specific formis assumed
for 11(Y); therefore, it isnot necessary to developa model in which
different elements of the Xvector may influence differentstructural
parameters of the 11(Y) function. TheX's are assijned to induceparallel
shifts in H(Y), whatever theparticular properties of 11(Y)may be. The
PH model is therefore usedto test whether thebargaining law variables
are associated with an upward shiftin the union hazard ratefunction.
III. Data and VariableDefinitions
p4nt Variables: NonunionPuration and Post-Law Duration
The likelihood function thatdescribes transitions intounionization
for each city and town isgenerated from a durationvariable, Y. To
calculate Y., specific informationon dates of transition of police
departments into unionizationare required. To that end, Iuse responses
from a 1979 survey conducted
by Freeman, Ichniowski and Lauer.0This
survey contains the questions: "Does
your city have a written labor
-
contractcovering wages, hours, and conditions ofemployment for police
personnel? and "Whatyearwas the first written laborcontract signed?"
Here, it is assumed that cities
responding affirmatively to the first
question have continually beenparty to a police contract since the date
given in response to the secondquestion. This informationcovers nearly
1,000 municipalities with populationsabove 10,000 thatreport municipal
police employment in the Yearbook in 1978.11 Thissurvey6
specifically asks if a written collective bargaining agreementwas
negotiated, so that other sorts of police associationsthat do not
formally bargain are treated as non-union.
Two different duration variables are used as the dependentvariable:
nonunion duration (N1JDUR) calculated as the number of years a city
remains nonunion after a given fixed year; and a post-lawduration
(PLDUR) calculated as the number of years a city remainsnonunion after
the year a bargaining law is enacted. For NIJDUR, twodates were consid-
ered as possible starting dates for calculating the durations:the year
in which the first police department in the United Stateshad a written
labor contract (which is 1911 in this sample), or a year just preceding
the enactment of the first police bargaining policy in theUnited States
(which is 1959, in Wisconsin). Since the data indicatethat very few
departments unionized between 1911 and 1959,the first approach would
greatly increase the length of "nonuniondurations" in pre-law years and
reduce dramatically the proportion of city-years that hadunion transi-
tions in the pre-law period. The second approach is adoptedin this
study for calculating NIJDUR since it is less likelyto indicate an
increase in post-law union transition probabilities. N1JDUR, then,is
defined: year of unionization -1955.The nine departments in the sample
that obtained their first written collective bargaining agreement prior
to 1956 are assigned a value of 1 for NUDUR. Those departmentsthat were
still nonunion in 1979, the year of the survey, receive avalue of 24 for
N1JDUR and are treated as right-censored observations.
AnaLrzing N1JDUR is a useful starting point for comparingthe number
of years municipalities remain nonunion across groups that wereand werenot covered by bargaining laws.There are several distinctlimitations
in how parameters onbargaining law variables in thisanalysis can be
interpreted. These parameters will beunderestimates of the effect of
bargaining laws on thepropensity of police departments toorganize.
Specifically, as defined in more detailin the next section, amunicipal
observation is assigned a valueof one for a given bargaininglaw dummy
variable if it is in a state thatenacted such a law and if theThunjcj-
pality did not Unionize prior to thelaw's enactment. (Theimportant
distinction is that cities thatunionized before a law was enactedare
included in the 'no law"comparison group.) The principaldifficulty
with analyzing andinterpreting PH models of NUDUR is that
bargaining
laws were enacted in differentyears in different states. Specifically,
a municipality can only be treatedas having or not having a law, andit
is this legal status that isbeing associated with themunicipality's
value of MJIMJR. Without additional
controls these NUDUR modelsare
treating city's with laws as having lawsthroughout the entire period.
If parameters from a PH modelindicate that bargaining lawsare asso-
ciated with lower values ofNUDUR, those parameters underestimate the
effects of laws on union growth inthese NUDUR models sincemany laws
were not enacted until late in the 1959to 1978 period.
One way to adjust for thisproblem is to incorporate a variable that
measures the number of years thatpass before a law is enacted. (The
next section presents the exact definitionof this control variableas
well as limitations inherent in thisapproach.) Another, more direct,
approach is to consider the alternate
dependent duration variable, PLDUR.
PLDUR,whichequals 'year of unionization -yearof law," directly
78
corrects the dependent variable by eliminating from the duration measure
any "pre-law" years. PH models analyzingPLDUR will provide accurate
comparisons of the effects of different kinds of laws onunionization
propensities within a sample of municipalities that have laws. The
obvious difficulty here is how to incorporate municipal observations that
unionized prior to a law or that are in states that never had a law.
Several possible answers to this question will be explored and will be a
central part of the development of the empirical results. All alterna-
tives will involve including a "year of law" covariate. The discussion
now turns to the definition of bargaining law and "year oflaw"
variables.
Bargaining Laws: The Timing and Substance of Time-Varying "Treatments"
Within the PH framework, the laws play a role similar to time-
varying treatment variables in biological mortality studies.As de-
scribed above, the definition of a given law variable depends on whether
a city was covered by a law while it was still nonunion.In other words,
a municipality is treated as part of a "no law" categoryif either of two
conditions are met: (1) if the municipality is in a state that never had
a bargaining policy or law; or (2) if the municipalityis in a state that
enacted a law but unionization occurred prior to enactment of thelaw.12
Also indicated above is the fact that because different sets of
cities were covered by laws in different years, a year of law (LAWYR)
must be considered in the analysis. LAYRisincorporated in NIJDUR
models in order to try to get better estimates of the effects of the
barga:ning laws on unionization propensities. Specifically,where LAWYR
isgreater, city!s have been exposed to the law forless time, and theprobability of being unionized by 1978 will be lower(if the laws do in-
crease unionization). In models analyzing NTJDURthe proportional hazards
parameter on LAWYR should therefore be negative. There
are, however,
additional difficulties when includinga L.AWYR variable. "No law" cities
by construction are not affected by either theparameters on the law
variables or those on the LAWYR variable. Inthe presence of a variable
like LAWYR, where the definition of thevariable directly depends on an-
otber covariate control variable (here thedummylawvariables), precise
methods for testing the significance of theestimated parameters on the
other "treatment"—type dummyvariableshave yet to be developed.13
Despite these various difficulties, it is clear thatin N1JDUR models
where LAWYR is included in the model, theparameters on the bargaining
la. variables will increase inmagnitude and the parameter on the LAWYR
variable will be negative if laws do in factspur police Unionization.
In moving to PH models with PLDURasthe dependent variable, LAWYR
is defined in a slightly differentway and conceptually serves a very
different purpose. Since all "pre-law"years are eliminated from the
dependent variable in this case, the parameteron LAWYRwillindicate
whether union transition rates (values of PLDUR)tendto be higher
(shorter) in later time periods. For example, inWisconsin, values of
PLDURarecalculated as years after 1959 that a city remainsnonunion,
while in Massachusetts PLDURequalsthe number of years after 1965.
Since the rate of unionization in Wisconsinmay be somewhat slower than
in Massachusetts simply because the general climatetoward public employ-
ee unionism was less favorable in the late 1950's than inthe mid-1960's,
LAWYR is introduced as an additional covarjatein the PH model. Since
the Wisconsin bargaining policy in 1959was the first in the United1o
States,this covariate will be defined as: LAWRB= yearof law -1958.
The common perception is that acceptance of public employee unionism grew
over the 1958 to 1978 period, so that the estimated parameter on LAWYRB
is expected to be positive. While PH-models using PLDUR as the dependent
variable can be directly applied to a sample of cities with laws, much of
the empirical analysis considers results obtained from expanding this
analysis in different ways to include the "no law" observations.
Yet to be addressed is the fact that the content of the laws and
policies, as well as their timing, varies significantly from state to
state. A degree of subjectivity is required in categorizing these
different legal environments. In developing these categories, I focus on
two related dimensions: the degree to which bargaining rights are pro-
tected and the degree to which impasse procedures ensure closure of the
bargaining process.
The first category is "bargaining permitted" (BP). These legal
frameworks establish the legality of collective bargaining for covered
employees. However, under such frameworks employers are not obligated to
bargain with employees. These policies are often stated as giving
employees some weak form of rights "to meet and confer with" or "to
present proposals to" their employers.
The second law category is comprised of states which have a "duty-
to-bargain" provision (DTB). In moving from BP to DTB environments, the
choice to bargain or not shifts from the employer to the employees.
Employees may be more likely to try to organize where employers have an
affirmatie obligation to bargain with representatives of the police than
where empioyers may still choose not to bargain.11
Still, a DTB provision does not necessarily ensure closureto the
bargaining process. In the private sector, the strike threatforces
negotiators to evaluate impasses and ultimately moves theparties to some
resolution of differences in their positions.However, police strikes
are illegal in the United States (except invery rare circumstances).
One can imagine an employer in a DTB environment¶tbargaining but not
conceding to any union demands since the strike threatmay be signifi-
cantly dampened for these public employees. By 1978, fourteenstates had
enacted some form of compulsory interest arbitrationstatutes for police
negotiations. These environments form the fourth lawcategory (ARB).
Under such a statute, police labor organizations neednot rely on the
final consent of the public employer to determine theterms and condi-
tions of their employment, but rather a neutral thirdparty has power to
arbitrate contract terms. If employeesperceive that this shift in final
decision making authority enhances theopportunity for securing greater
wage gains, employees would have an additional stimulus for formingan
employee organization. What limited empirical evidence there ison the
14 impact of arbitration on salaries provides some support for this claim.
In any case, as long as employees perceive thepotential for such an
impact of arbitration, this could be enough to stimulate uniongrowth.
To summarize the conceptual argumentsconcerning why these catego-
ries of laws may be associated with different uniontransition rates,
employers may be able to resist unionization efforts to a lesser and
lesser extent in moving from "no law" environments whereno union repre-
sentation mechanism is available, to "BP" environments where thelegality
of bargaining is established, and finally to environmentswith a duty-
to-bargain provision that obligates employers to bargain whenemployees12
organize. Among those states with duty-to-bargain provisions (DTB or ARB
equals one), it is possible that compulsory arbitration provisions
increase police wage rates of unionized departments so that the demand
for unionization among police would be even greater in ARB states than in
DTB states.
Other Covariates
While there is no comprehensive, well-defined theory of union growth
that clearly identifies other variables that might also influence union-
ization propensities, previous empirical studies on union growth and
representation elections can be used to identify aspects of police
departments and municipalities that might also affect unionization rates.
First, it is important to incorporate other state characteristics as
controls since bargaining laws and policies are defined along state
boundaries. Here, the state—level controls include four geographic
region dummy variables (Northeast, North Central, South, and West), the
percentage of a state's non-agricultural work force who are public
employees, and the percentage of a state's private sector nonagricultural
work force that is unionized. The region controls and the percent union
variable will indicate how favorable the climate is toward unionization.
If patterns in the locus of public sector unionization parallel those in
the private sector, one would expect an increase in the union hazard
function (i.e., positive coefficients) for Northeastern and North Central
cities and a negative union hazard function among Southern cities.
Similarly, the percent union varible should obtain a positive coeffi-
cient. High levels of private sector unionism should correspondto13
higher area wages and may increase the expectations abouta reasonable
wage increase. This would again lead toa positive correlationbetween
this variable and union growth in the publicsector. Where a greater
proportion of a state's workforce is in public employement,a greater
degree of acceptance of Unionism may have been fostered.Conversely, the
taxpaying public may find it more important to be representedby public
managers who will oppose unionism (and keep labor costs down) wherethere
are relatively more public employees.
Several municipal-level control variablesare available for a large
proportion of the municipalities in the sample:population, number of
departmental employees, per capita income,per capita municipal revenue,
central city dummy variable, and threegovernment-type dummy variables
(Council-Manager, Mayor-Council, and Commission).15
The first two variables acknowledge theimportance of unit size in
the unionization process. In the privatesector, the most common finding
is that unit size is negatively related to unionsupport in certification
electionsj6 Thesign of the correlation in this public sector sample
may be different for several reasons. First, the private sectorsamples
are generally certification elections from the 1970s orearly 1980s.
They do not include the earliest unionization campaigns of the 1930sand
1940s, many of which may have had relatively large units.Here, in
contrast, the study is designed to consider the process of unionization
among all municipalities with populations over 10,000 from the time when
virtually none of the municipal poiice departments were organized.Also,
.t is reasonable to expect bureaucratization to increase withcity size.
n order to obtain a louder voice in these environments,employees may
develop a greater interest in unirnization. (Since population is14
available for a slightly larger sample of municipalities than is the
department size variable, and since these two variables are highly
correlated, empirical results are reported in the next section for models
incorporating only the population control.)
Ability-to-pay variables (revenue and income) might indicate an
increase in the public employer's ability to satisfy more of the diverse
interests groups, including the police department, vying for a share of
the municipal budget. In this way, managers in wealthier cities and
towns might be better able to avoid unionization. Conversely, the
incentive to unionize may be greater where municipal revenues are larger.
In this way, these controls play a role similar to firm profitability in
private sector unionization studies. The impact of profitability on
unionization rates in bargaining unit level studies has received little
attention in the existing private sector studies.17
Central cities may be associated with relatively high area wages, a
greater degree of private sector unionization, and perhaps more hazardous
duties for Its police. If these forces make police more likely to
consider unionization, this variable will cause an upward shift in the
union hazard function. Finally the degree of bureaucratization of
different government structures might affect the responsiveness of an
employer to employee desires, so that certain government structures might
be more highly correlated with the probability of municipal unionism.
While a number of these controls do vary over the period considered,
it is necessary to assume that the rankings of municipalities along the
dinnsions of the controls are reasorably stable over the period (e.g.,
rLatively populous cities at the start of the period still ranked high
in population by the end of the period examined).18 It is also necessary15
to assume that Unionization of a
municipality's police department does
not affect that city's relativeranking along the dimensions of the
control variables (e.g., if a relativelywealthy suburban town organizes
in the early 1960s, it is stillrelatively wealthy by the end of the
period.) While these assumptionsmay be more problematic for some
controls (particularly the revenuevariables) than for others (such as
central city status or government type), thesestate and municipal
characteristics may be correlated with the locusand rate of police
unionization and with state bargaining laws.
Therefore, they are poten-
tially important controls that help guardagainst overestimating the
impact of bargaining laws on union transitionprobabilities.
IV. Empirical Results
NIJDUR models
-Parameterson bargaining law variables from PH modelsusing differ-
ent samples and different dependent variablesare presented in Table 1.
The Column (1) specification with NTIDURas the dependent variable ad-
dresses the question: Do nonunionmunicipalities that were covered by a
law at some point prior to 1978 unionizeearlier in the 1958-1978 period?
From the column (1) estimates, municipalitiesin DTB and ARB have signi-
ficantly lower post-1955 "nonunion durations"; thatis, municipalities
in these environments are characterizedby relatively high probabilities
of a union transition. The point estimateon the BP variable is posi-
tive, but insignificant. As described in theprevious section, the
column (1) model is not an appropriate test forgauging the magnitude
of the change n the probability of unionizationthat occurs as a city



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimate the effect of the laws since lawswere enacted at many different
points in time after the 1955starting time for the NUDUR variable.By
the same token, even thoughDTB > incolumn (1), ARB lawsmay in
fact increase Unionization
probabilities more than DTB laws if ARB laws
are enacted later in the 1955-1978period than DTB laws.
A first method foraccounting for the fact that bargaining lawswere
enacted in different years is to
incorporate LAWYRA (i.e., years after
1955 that a law was enacted) in themodel. For no law municipalities
the LAWYRA variable, like thedummy law variables, is set to zeroso that
unionization probabilities for cities inthese environments are not
influenced by this adjustment factor.While formal significance tests of
the parameters on the law dummyvariables cannot be performed when the
LAWYRA covariate is added to theequation, one does observe that the
magnitudes of all the parameters increases
substantially. The LAWYRA
variable is not, however, an entirelysatisfactory control for the fact
that the enactment of a lawoccurs at different points in time. Post
facto, it is known with certainty that cities forwhich a law variable
equals one did not Unionize in pre-law
years. However, LAWYRA -.093
suggests that a one year increase in LAWYRAcorresponds to an adjustment
of union transition probabilities ofonly .088 per year (i.e.,
1 -exp[-.093}). A direct way to utilize thisinformation is to adjust
the dependent variable directly (bysubtracting all "pre-law" years from
the duration variable). This leads to theanalysis of PLDUR as a de-
pendent variable.17
PLDUR models
PLDUR(i.e.,year of unionization -yearof law) is analyzed in the
column (3) model within a sample of municipalities for which one ofthe
law variables is equal to one. This analysis directly asks the question:
how much do different laws affect the probability of remaining nonunion
from the time the law is enacted? Since this sample only includes
municipalities with some law variable equal to one, BP isomitted as the
comparison group. The parameter estimates from PHmodels without and
with the LAWYRB control (which equals number of years after 1958 that the
law was enacted) are presented in columns (3) and (4) respectively. Both
models produce similar estimates. Using those in column (4), one can
calculate the relative differences in these hazard rates of unionization
between any pair of law groups. Arbitration statutes are associatedwith
unionization rates that are some 6.16 times greater than those in BP
environments (i.e., exp [1.819]), while DTB laws are associated with
unionization rates that are 4.96 times higher than those in BP states.
(Significance tests for the law parameters are performed inthe column
(4) model since LAWYRB is defined for all observations in this sample.)
The relative difference between unionization probabilities inARB and DTB
environments is given by exp [1.819 -1.6021=1.24.From the estimation
of other related models, however, this ARB vs. DTB difference inthe
20
column (4) model is judged to be insignificant.
In these column (3) and (4) models that are not confounded withthe
question of how to treat 'no law" municipalities,several interesting
results emerge. Utiionization rates are similar in environments thathave
a duty-to-bargain 1:-ovision regardless of whether a compulsoryinterest
arbitration mechanism is available. Whether or not an arbitration18
mechanism increases (or might beperceived to increase) police salaries
above the levels in other DTBenvironments, unionization rates are not
increased further because of an arbitrationmechanism. Also interesting,
within this restricted sample ofmunicipalities, LAWYRB has a positive
but insignificant parameter estimate.From this model's estimate the
general climate toward public employee unionism didnot increase signifi-
cantly over the 1958 to 1978 period. Forexample, post-law unionization
rates are no lower in states like Connecticutor Massachusetts which
enacted their DTB provisions in 1965 than ina state like Oklahoma which
enacted its DTB provision sixyears later. While the column (3) and (4)
models provide interesting insights anda useful benchmark for comparing
differences in unionization rates associatedwith different kinds of
laws, these models do not provide any informationon the important
comparison between unionization rates in environments withand without
laws.
To return to this central question, theno law cities are introduced
back into the sample in column (5). To dothis, PLDIJR for "no law
cities" is defined as the length of time after 1958 thata municipality
remains nonunion. Again LAWYRB is set equal tozero for this group of
observations, and since the definition of the LAWYRB variabledepends on
whether or not a city has some law variableequal to one, significance
tests are not performed. This model produces estimatesof the effects of
the various laws relative to no law environments thatare substantially
larger than the "underestimates" in column (1), but smaller thanthose in
the column (2) model with the problematic LAWYRAcontrol. However, there
is a clear reason for suspecting that the lawvs. no law comparisons made
from the column (5) parameters are also underestimatesof the effect that19
these bargaining laws have on unionization rates. Specifically, this
sample eliminates from consideration the fact that none of the cities in
the law categories unionized while they had previously been in no law
environments. To address this problem in sample construction, the column
(6)-(8) models are developed.
PLDUR models with "Expandedt' Samples
In columns (6)-(8), a new sample for analysis is constructed.
Specifically, there is one observation for each legal environment that a
nonunion municipality experiences. For example, Maine enacted a DTB
policy in 1969. A city in Maine which did not unionize before 1969 will
be represented by two observations. The first has PLDUR =1969-1958
=11,LAWYRB =0,and all law variables equal to zero. This no law
municipal observation is also censored because Maine enacted a statute
before it could be determined how many more years would pass before this
city would unionize in a no law environment. Such a city would be
represented by a second observation as well for which: PLDIJR =yearof
unionization -1969;LAWYRB =19691958 =11;and DTB =1.If the city
in question unionized by 1978 it Is not censored; otherwise, this second
observation is censored. Cities in Maine that unionized before 1969 are
treated just as they were in the column (5) sample with one uncensored
observation that has PLDURyear of unionization -1958,and LAWYRB and
all law dummy variables equal to zero. Cities in states that never
enacted laws are also unaffected and are represented by one observation.
Estimates from thmodelthat maintains the desirable features of
PLD1SR as the dependent variable (as opposed to N1JDUIR) as well as the20
"pre-law" information on cities that eventuallywere covered by laws are
presented in column (6). All law parameters are in factlarger than the
column (5) underestimates. They alsoare larger than the estimates in
column (2). Also when compared to the column(1), (2), or (5) parame-
ters, those in column (6) yield estimates of the DTBvs. BP and ARB vs.
BP that are much more similar to theones obtained from the column (4)
model which is specifically designed to make sucha comparison (i.e., in
Column (6), ARB -BP1.370 and DTB BP =1.399;while in column
(4) the comparable figures are 1.819 and 1.602). Incolumn (7), the
model is reestimated with a restrictedsample. Here those "no law"
observations in states that never had a laware deleted. This leaves two
kinds of no law observations in the sample: (1)uncensored observations
for cities that unionize before the enactment oftheir state's law; and
(2) censored observations that represent the"pre-law" existence of
cities that had not unionized by the time theirstates enacted a law.
The column (7) estimates are similar to those obtainedin column (6).
Using the column (6) specification, one obtains thefollowing estimates
for the relative unionization probabilitiesacross legal environments:
ARB, DTB, and EP increase unionization rates by 22.5times, 23.2 times,
and 5.7 times above those in no law environments. While thecolumn (6)
model incorporates several desirable features, themagnitudes of the
effects for ARB and DTB are much larger than those inprevious columns.
Several simple calculations of the annual rates of unionizationin the
first few years after DTB and ARB laws arepassed relative to annual
uniorlizatio: rates in states without laws alsosuggest DTB and ARB
effects cfhis magnitude.2121
The column (6) specification incorporates several important features
that help provide more accurate estimates of the effect of bargaining
laws on union transition rates: (1) by using PLDUR as the dependent
duration variable, durations are calculated from the time the law is
enacted; (2) the "expanded" sample still includes important information
on nonunion municipalities that were eventually covered by a law but did
not unionize prior to the law; (3) municipalities that are in states that
never pass a law are still in the sample, but "no law" observations are
assigned a value of zero for the LAWYRB control indicating that the
duration variable begins from an earlier starting date. One final
elaboration to the column (6) specification is also possible with the
"expanded" sample approach. Specifically, one can also use this approach
to account for the fact that several states amended their initial bar-
gaining laws. The most common amendment is that in seven states an
arbitration mechanism was added within the framework of a duty-to-bargain
law. In these states, if most of the unionization occurred after the
amendment (i.e., during ARE years and not DTB years), the results in the
column (6) specification may be overstating the effect of DTB laws and
understating the effect of ARE provisions.
To incorporate these amendments into the model, an additional
observation is added to the column (6) sample any time a municipality
remains nonunion past the time that a bargaining law is amended. For
example, Wisconsin moved from no law to BP (in 1959), from BP to DTB (in
1962) and from DTB to ARE (in 1971), thereby passing through all four
legal eivironments. In the column (6) sample and specification, there
will boneobservation for any Wisconsin municipality that unionized22
before 1959, and two observations for thosemunicipalities that did not
Unionize before 1959. Under the finalelaboration, a Wisconsin munici-
pality that did not unionize until the ARB lawwas enacted (say in 1975)
would be represented by thefollowing four observations:
(1) Nonunion until 1959; PLDUR =1;LAWYRB =0;law =none;cen-
sored yes.
(2) Nonunion between 1959 and 1962; PLDUR3; LAWYRB1; law =
BP;censored =yes.
(3) Nonunion between 1962 and1971; PLDIJR =9;LAWYRB =4;law =
DTB;censored =yes.
(4) Unionized in 1975; PLIJUR =4;LAWYRB =13;law =ARB;censored
=no.
Had this hypothetical Wisconsincity not unionized by 1978, the fourth
observation would be also censored and PLDURwould equal 7.
When the PH model is reestimated with the
newly expanded sample, the
parameters in column (8) are estimated. Whencompared to column (6), the
effects of the bagaining laws are reducedsomewhat, while the parameter
on LAWYRB increases. Again, in the column (8)model, when the ARE and
]JTB variables are collapsed intoone dummy variable the explanatorypower
of the model is not decreasedsignificantly.
The underestimates of the bargaining laweffects produced from the
column (1) NUDUR model indicate that theparameters in the DTB and ARB
variables are significant. Still it isimportant to put the magnitudes
of the parameters on the bargaining lawvariable from other models into
son comparative context because of the limitationson formal signifi-
caice testing in models that include a LAWYRB covariate.First, while23
the parameter on LAWYRB in the columns (5)-(8) specifications is signifi-
cant, reestimating these same models without the LAWYRBleaves the
parameters on the bargaining laws and their associatedstandard errors
unchanged. While it might be argued that such models without theLAWYRB
covariate are not completely specified, the results further suggest the
significance of the bargaining law parameters.
-
TheRelative Impact of Bargaining Laws and Other Covariates
An alternative way to gauge the relative importance of the bargain-
ing laws on police unionization rates is to compare thelaw parameters to
parameters on other variables in the model. Column (1)of Table 2
presents the complete set of parameters from the Table (1),column (8)
model. Since the magnitudes of theparameters are affected by the
units of measurement for the dependent variables, the relative magnitudes
of the various 's do not gauge the relative "importance" of the covari—
ates. Column (2) of Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations
of the covariates for the N =793sample.(The N =793sample is used to
calculate sample characteristics instead of the N =1359sample since the
latter includes more than one observation for certain municipalities and,
therefore, would not give an accurate picture of the "average"munici-
pality.) Column (3) calculates for the dummy variables in themodel the
quantity: exp[]. This calculation yields the ratioof the union hazard
rate for a municipality with the given characteristic and onewithout it
(all other covariates the same). Column 4 presents the relativeincrease
in the union hazard rate that would result from a one standard deviation
increase in a given covariate. This is given by: exp[13( +a)]/exp[l.
These calculations indicate th the factor that is most important in





































































































The Impact of Bargaining Laws, StateCharacteristics,
and Municipal Characteristics on Police Unionization
(1) (2) (3)a
Relative Increases
Means and in Unionization
(standard Probability from
deviations) 0 to 1 increase


































performed on parameters for law dummy variables24
The results obtained with the PH model for a national municipal-level
sample of police departments gives additional support to Saltzman's
conclusion based on state-level analyses of teacher unionism: bargaining
laws are the single most important determinant of public sector union-
22
ization.
Among other covariates, there are significant effects associated
with the degree of private sector unionization in the state, the region
variables,23 and central city status. The insignificant impact of the
population variable does not necessarily contradict the observation that
the largest cities in the United States are more likely to have unionized
police departments. Central city and population are highly correlated.
Once one controls for the central city effect, one does not find that
municipalities with relatively large populations experience increased
propensities to unionize. While the city income and revenue variables
both have positive parameters, neither is judged to be significant.
Survival Plots
A useful way to summarize the data and to underscore the importance
of the bargaining laws is to present plots of the survival functions for
various "representative" cities. Figure 1 shows the survival plots for
four municipalities that have average characteristics but differ only
according to the legal environment for police bargaining. These esti-
mates are obtained using the Table 2 model (i.e., the Table 1, column (8)
model). The survival plots for the BP, DTB and ARB municipalities begin
in 1965, 1968, and 1968, respectively. These years represent the average
of the years in which these forms of bargaiing law were enacted.
However, in evaluating the survival functic,s, the unionization probabil-
















IGURE 1: Survival Probability Plots For The "Average'Municipality
Under The Four Different Legal Environments
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effect. Figure 1 then shows a municipality that is the same in all
respects except the nature of the bargaining law. One observes that the
no law environments are characterized by very little unionization. The
1979 survival probability for this type of average municipality is
approximately .83. The BP, DTB, and ARB municipalities have 1979 sur-
vival probabilities of .59, .29, and .25, respectively.
In Figure 2, the plots represent the survival functions for four
municipalities that have the average characteristics of a no law, BP,
DTB, and ARB municipality. The plots are quite similar to those in
Figure 1, underscoring the fact that the legal environment more than any
characteristic dictates the union hazard probabilities. The differences
between the "nonunion survival" rates of the no law municipality and
those of municipalities in other legal environments is slightly larger
than the differences in Figure 1. This reflects the fact that "no law"
cities have lower values of PCTUNION and are less likely to be in the
Northeast region (both of these characteristics are positively associated
with the union hazard function). From Figure 2, one estimates survival
probabilities in 1979 for the average no law, BP, DTB, and ARB munici-
palities of .87, .36, .02, and .01, respectively. The survival plots
clearly indicate the central finding of this study: changes in unioniza-
tion rates among municipal police in the United States occurred after
the enactment of bargaining laws.
Conclusion
Using a proportional hazards framework for estimating the rate of
unionization among municipal police departments, this study documents the
critical role played by the nature of the statutory bargaining26
environments. The police bargaining lawsare clearly not a result of
already existing bargaining. The speed with whichunionization occurs in
the first few years after enactment oflaws, particularly those laws with
some sort of duty-to-bargain provision, perhapssuggest some form of pent—
up demand for unionization. However, the experience in theprivate sector
where unionism continues to decline inspite of the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)suggests that bargaining statutes may
be a necessary but insufficient Condition forunion growth. Other factors
specific to the public sector might help to account forthe rapid rate of
public sector un-ionization after bargaining lawswere enacted. Unlike the
standard private sector model of the effects ofunionization where
increased wages come at the expense ofemployment levels, it may be
possible that public sector unionizationmay simultaneously increase wages
24
and employment. Also, public sector laws may be more effective safe-
guards of employees' bargaining rights, since these lawsmay have stricter
enforcement of st-i1fer penalties for violations thandoes the NLRA in the
25
private sector. Finally, public employers as agents of thegovernment
may be less likely than private sector employers to violate the letteror
spirit of a bargaining statute.27
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